Prospects for further research

5 Prospects for further research

Given the tremendous amount of literature on European integration treating – in one way or another – the allocation of competence between member states and the EU, this Living Review could not cover all contributions and had to be selective. Nevertheless, our overview on normative concepts and empirical research has revealed a lot of different theoretical and analytical approaches, stimulating ongoing discussion and research in this field. Despite the unique features of the European political system, we regard comparative research as particularly fruitful. Studies on comparative federalism can really sharpen our understanding of the alternative options for the allocation of competences and of the driving forces and counter-forces of integration. Yet this research seems more relevant to us if it clarifies the differences between the EU and existing federations than if it emphasises similarities. On the other hand, theories of European integration and multilevel governance point out the complexity of structures and a plurality of factors influencing how powers are distributed between levels, a complexity which is difficult to deal with in comparative research designs. Consequently, there is no one best research strategy and further research in this field should, in principle, continue to apply different approaches and designs.

Furthermore, this Living Review has identified some weaknesses of concepts used in the literature and also deficits in empirical research. Most normative theories overemphasise the possibility of separating powers. This perspective appears also as an implicit assumption in empirical theories which explain the shift or the delegation of powers from the national to the European level. Moreover, these theories often focus too much on the integration, while leaving aside the driving forces towards disintegration or decentralisation of powers.

Normative theories of federalism, originally introduced to the study of the EU from a comparative political science perspective, have been developed for and discussed mainly with regard to federal nation states. As we have seen, they are only of restricted value with regard to the EU polity, which is characterised by federal as well as confederal elements, and does not allow for a clear-cut allocation of competences via constitutional rules. Moreover, both abstract normative reasoning on an ideal allocation of competences as well as recommendations of devices to implement subsidiarity underestimate the fact that the already existing political system of the EU cannot be deliberately shaped by a “constitutional designer” due to diverging interests of member states and path dependencies of institutions already set in place. How powers are shared in practice depends on the interplay between the EU institutions and member state governments, parliaments or interest groups, to name but the most important actors. Moreover, in the highly differentiated system of the EU, the effective powers of single actors, institutions, or jurisdictions are dependent on and defined by the mode of decision-making on the issue at stake and the particular modes of multilevel governance.

Nonetheless, the EU is a political system with inherent dynamics of change: empirical theories as well as normative accounts aiming at the provision of a concept for a balanced and efficient allocation of competences between jurisdictions have to take into account the interests and powers of actors at different levels to influence the effective allocation of competences in a given situation of decision-making, or even the ability to change the actual balance unilaterally (see Faber and Wessels 2006 for an analysis of potential strategies and perspectives of the European Council). Otherwise, they end up with idealistic recommendations, which are futile with regard to reality.

Empirical theories, too, often tend to focus on a two-tiered structure of the EU. However, since the early 1950s, the process of European integration has constantly passed through cycles of increasing differentiation (Wessels 1997 ). As a result, today’s EU is not a coherent political system in a given territory but possesses a highly diversified and fragmented structure. Empirical research on integration dynamics and the transfer of competences must consider this specific structure in order to generate a more precise picture of the actual processes and developments. In this respect, comparative research on federalism can disclose new perspectives concerning causes, patterns and consequences of intergovernmental relations in different constitutional systems, types of democracies, party systems or societal conditions.

When studying competence allocation as well as the different patterns of cooperation, the still existing pillar structure of the EU is an obvious point of departure because of the varying degrees of institutionalisation, the different decision-making procedures and actors involved in policy-making in each of the three pillars. This is closely connected to the need to distinguish between policy areas. Countless case studies of European policy-making emphasise the special characteristics of each policy field. These particularities hinder the identification of consistent and uniform patterns of competence allocation or rather “integration” in the European multilevel polity (see Lindberg and Scheingold 1970 ). More recently, the varying territorial scope of policy programmes or fields of cooperation on the European level has been reconsidered, an idea that has been discussed in terms like “Europe at different pace”, “Kerneuropa”, or “Europe à la carte”. It has gained new momentum in view of the successive enlargement rounds and the incorporation of the provisions on closer cooperation in Art. 43-45 TEU. Future research will need to focus more on the causes and consequences of a territorially differentiated competence allocation. Whether this is correctly portrayed by the term functional federalism has to be considered.

In particular with regard to enlargement, the failed ratification of a European constitutional treaty and the opting-out and secession clauses of the Reform Treaty, possible tendencies of disintegration should be taken into account more seriously. Growing economic, social and cultural inequalities between member states, increasing scepticism of the population and a firm commitment to the principle of subsidiarity, as it is laid down in the treaties, might dissolve the formerly prevailing commitment to the creation of “an ever closer union” (Art. 1 TEU). But again this will probably not lead to a simple up and down movement of competences between levels but to a simultaneous integration and disintegration in different policies and possibly also in different territories. We have to expect a variety of shifts in power between interlocked levels of the EU.

For these reasons, empirical research on European integration in general can still gain a lot by adopting “a plurality of lower-level and simpler concepts” (Scharpf 2001 : 4) for the description of European governance modes instead of relying on rival theoretical concepts like intergovernmentalism and supranationalism or of creating new holistic approaches for European multilevel governance. Even if the European Union is regarded as a political system sui generis, when dealing with the vertical allocation of competence and the application of shared competences in multilevel governance, we should stop looking for holistic approaches and overarching concepts (grand theory) that do not provide a reasonable and useful contribution to research in view of the complexity of the field.

In agreement with Scharpf, we instead suggest the combination of an inductive and deductive approach of theory-building, the development and testing of a variety of simpler theories and models that will combine with the overall picture of European integration and competence allocation. Starting with concepts of a lower range, i.e. those limited to particular patterns of governance, allows us to find out where dynamics of integration produce incompatible structures or where they create self-enforcing mechanisms towards either integration or disintegration. Hence, we would expect research on European governance to yield some interesting new insights when placing emphasis on specific patterns of multilevel governance instead of the whole picture.