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Arguments about the impact of EU integration on national parliaments are at the centre of the debate on
the quality and future of democracy in Europe. The dividing line is broadly between those who regard
national parliaments as “losers” (Maurer and Wessels 2001
) of European integration and those
who argue that national parliaments have more or less successfully “fought back” (Raunio and
Hix 2000) and, thus, maintained, if not, in fact, enhanced their position at the level of member
states and within the multi-level governance system of the European Union more generally. The
literature on the Europeanisation of national parliaments has evolved greatly since the early
1990s, when a first batch of studies identified the challenges that EU integration presented
(Judge 1995; Moravcsik 1994; Norton 1996; Schmidt 1997; Wiberg 1997), to a broad base of work that examines
not only the ‘differential’ institutional adaptation of national parliaments (Bergman 1997; Kiiver 2006; Maurer
and Wessels 2001; O’Brennan and Raunio 2007; Raunio 2005a; Saalfeld 2005), but also behavioural
(Auel and Benz 2005; Benz 2004; Holzhacker 2002) and attitudinal Europeanisation (Wessels 2005) of
parliamentary parties and members of parliament.
Two related observations provide the starting point for much work in this area. First, national
parliaments have lost out due to the transfer of policy-making powers, and here, in particular, legislative
powers to the EU-level. Detailed expositions of this observation can, e.g., be found in Auel 2005; Hansen
and Scholl 2002; Holzhacker 2002; Maurer and Wessels 2001 and Norton 1996. Second, European
integration has tilted the balance of powers at the domestic level decisively in favour of national executives,
leading to a major shift in executive-legislative relations. The latter argument takes its cue
largely from Moravcsik (1994), who suggested that the participation of national executives in
supranational decision-making and negotiations strengthened their position at the domestic level. He
identified four causal mechanisms behind growing executive autonomy, including the shifting of
control over domestic agendas towards executives (initiative); the altering of decision-making
procedures in favour of executives (institutions); the magnifying of informational asymmetries
(information), in particular thanks to executives’ superior access to EU-related information;
and the multiplying of the potential domestic ideological justifications for government policies
(ideas).
Whereas early contributions focused principally on outlining the challenges to national parliaments resulting
from progressive integration, much recent work has provided detailed examinations of their responses. It is
through the study of these responses – institutional, behavioural and attitudinal – that some authors claim
to have found evidence of a reassertion of parliamentary powers. Melsæther and Sverdrup (2004: 7), for
instance, claim that “we have experienced a decade of stepwise strengthening of the parliaments in the EU
(…) the national parliaments have reformed themselves enabling them to play a more significant role in
formulating and motoring European politics”. Duina and Oliver (2005) go one step further when they
argue that the delegation of policy-making functions to the EU as such may benefit national
parliaments. In their view, “precedent setting” and “policy transfer” provide two venues through
which the “EU has helped national parliaments to fulfil their fundamental function of regulating
society. Precedent setting has done so by expanding the reach of parliaments, while policy
transfer has done so by confirming the viability of those parliaments as regulatory institutions”
(Duina and Oliver 2005: 176, emphasis in the original). Precedent setting implies that EU
integration involves the regulation of issues that had previously been neglected at the national level;
gender equality or more comprehensive anti-trust legislation in countries such as Italy might
serve as examples. Policy transfer allows national parliaments to learn from other member
states and to increase the effectiveness of their own regulatory frameworks, for instance, as a
result of the use of the Open Method of Coordination in the area of social and labour market
policy.
a) Institutional responses
Analyses of the institutional responses of national parliaments have long taken the principal form of
single-country studies and collections of single-country studies (e.g., Laursen and Pappas 1995; Maurer
and Wessels 2001; Norton 1996; Smith 1996). There was an early focus on the establishment of EU affairs
committees as a critical - and readily observable – institutional change (Raunio and Hix 2000); more
recently, growing efforts have been made to classify the institutional responses observed. Hansen and
Scholl (2002), for instance, distinguish broadly between (i) systemic and (ii) intra-institutional changes.
Systemic changes cover situations where structures or norms that encompass the political system are
changed at large; by contrast, institutional changes refer to alterations in the internal working
mode of an institution. Auel (2005: 308) classifies institutional changes with respect to their
function. She distinguishes institutional reforms that serve to enhance access to information; the
capacity to process information (infrastructure, selection mechanisms etc); and the right to
participate in policy-making (mainly through shaping the negotiating mandates for government
ministers in the Council of Ministers). Institutional reforms that deal with the right to obtain
information seem to have gained particular attention, and both Raunio (2005a) and Saalfeld (2005),
for instance, distinguish further with respect to information on first, second and third pillar
policies.
Other classifications have been developed in the context of comparative studies that provide
indicators for the study of parliamentary control capacities (Raunio 2005a), parliamentary
influence (Saalfeld 2005), or the power of opposition parties (Holzhacker 2005). Raunio (2005a)
and Saalfeld (2005) attempt to capture the overall ‘level of parliamentary scrutiny over EU
affairs’ and the ‘influence of national parliaments over EU affairs’, respectively. Raunio (2005a:
320ff) develops a three-dimensional indicator that includes (i) the involvement of specialised
committees in EU affairs, (ii) the access to information in terms of timing and scope, and (iii) the
power to mandate ministers through issuing voting instructions. Saalfeld (2005) develops an
even more inclusive indicator of his dependent variable – influence – that covers the presence
of a European Affairs Committee (EAC) and the timing of its establishment, the mandating
powers of committees, relations to the European Parliament, the jurisdiction of the EAC over
first, second and third pillar policies, the requirement of ministers to speak and report to this
Committee, the involvement of other committees in EU affairs and the general agenda control of
parliament.
Both Saalfeld (2005) and Raunio (2005a) have used their indicators to derive rankings of national
parliaments. In this, they build on the work by Maurer and Wessels (2001), who also concentrated on the
influence and power of parliaments and distinguished strong policy-making parliaments that are “national
players” (as in Denmark or Austria), potential or “latent national players” (as in Germany), would be
national players, which are, however, unable to challenge their governments (as in the case of the UK and
France) and “slow adaptors”. Raunio’s ranking is almost identical to Maurer and Wessels (2001),
while Saalfeld differs on a few countries and eventually dichotomises the parliaments into two
groups.
Finally, Holzhacker (2005) has sought to measure the power of opposition party groups
when scrutinising national governments’ EU-related decision-making. Insofar as the institutional
adaptation of national parliaments is concerned, he provides hints at a ‘legal (and political)
classification’ that distinguishes constitutional rights and statutory laws including standing orders of
parliaments.1
With a view to assessing parliamentary institutional responses, there is by now a broad literature on
which to draw. In fact, Raunio (2005a) argues that questions of indicators of levels of scrutiny and rankings
of parliament’s influence have now largely been resolved. Yet, analysts continue to use different concepts,
classifications and indicators with which to gauge institutional responses. It is not surprising, therefore,
that assessments of the consequences of institutional reform efforts also vary. There is broad
agreement that “national institutions have made substantial efforts in order to cope with the
requirements of the Union” (Mittag and Wessels 2003: 414); but whether these efforts have ultimately
benefited parliaments is contested. On the one hand, there are studies that stress the “failure of
national parliaments” (Judge 1995). In fact, parliamentary reforms may even have advantaged
governments rather than parliaments, for governments can use the need for parliamentary approval of
their negotiating stance as a bargaining tool in Brussels (Dimitrakopoulos 2001). Mittag and
Wessels (2003: 433) argue that “the relative weakness of national parliamentary institutions at
the EU level cannot be overlooked. The patterns of national governments and administrations
in preparing EU matters have been affected to only a limited degree. Continuous deficits in
parliaments’ ability to play the multi-level game reduce the influence of national deputies. The
involvement of parliaments in the EU policy-cycle remains weak and largely reactive. (…) Despite
some constitutional changes most national parliaments have remained ‘weak adaptors’ with
regard to the European policy-cycle (…) some have kept or gained a performance as national
performers. Their influence is mostly notable – if at all – in the final phase of implementation and
control”.
By contrast, Raunio and Hix (2000: 159) argue that “national parliaments can wield considerably more
influence than before”; that the “overall impact of European integration on parliamentary government in
the domestic arena has actually been rather modest” (2000: 143); and that “the parliaments have also
improved their position through more effective overall scrutiny of governments, particularly better access to
information. In fact, in some countries, European integration has been a catalyst in the re-emergence of
parliaments. Legislatures, alarmed by governmental autonomy resulting from integration, have started to
invest more resources in holding executive office-holders accountable on EU-related as well as
non-EU-related matters” (2000: 143). Whilst noting cross-country differences, the recent edited
collection of O’Brennan and Raunio (2007) also points in this direction. This interpretation of a
reassertion of national parliaments in the face of EU integration is echoed by Rizzuto (2003, 2004),
with specific reference to the French case, whereas Grossman and Sauger (2007) underline the
weakness of the French parliament in EU affairs, substantive formal increases in scrutiny powers
notwithstanding.
The reasons behind these divergent assessments are not too difficult to identify. Studies that are more
confident of the effectiveness of institutional adaptation of national parliaments tend to be focused on
parliamentary scrutiny in the area of EU affairs (Raunio and Hix 2000 are paradigmatic here). By contrast,
the more sceptical papers often take a broader view and pay attention to the full EU policy cycle
(Maurer and Wessels 2001; Wessels, Maurer, and Mittag 2003). Second, as will be further
discussed below, the understanding of information, as originally voiced by Moravcsik (1994),
is again more inclusive in the case of sceptical contributions. Thus, what matters is not just
access to information, but also to the ability to process the information (Auel 2005; Pollak and
Slominski 2003).
b) Behavioural and attitudinal Europeanisation
Similar to studies of institutional adaptation, analyses of the behavioural and attitudinal dimensions of
Europeanisation lend support both to proponents and opponents of de-parlamentarisation. Auel (2006),
Benz (2004) and Auel and Benz (2005) are critical of the de-parliamentarisation thesis. They note that the
“process of EU integration challenges the mechanisms of parliamentary systems in Member
States, that is the basic logic of interaction between the opposition, the majority as well as the
government” (Auel and Benz 2005: 373). However, “the institutionalised Europeanisation of national
parliaments covers only part of the overall changes in parliamentary systems. In order to assess
the true Europeanisation of parliamentary democracies, one has to look beyond the formal
institutions and take the strategies into account, which parliamentary actors develop to deal
with their power or lack thereof” (Auel and Benz 2005: 388). Thus, they draw attention to
adaptation beyond institutions by turning the focus on behaviour/actor strategies as the dependent
variable.
Benz (2004) notes that tight control of governments by parliaments may be dysfunctional
because it threatens to undermine the bargaining power of governments at the EU level. In order
to overcome the control dilemma, parliamentarians have chosen three different strategies: (i)
close informal co-operative relations with ministers, as in Denmark; (ii) ex ante mechanisms of
scrutinising EU legislative proposals in committee settings, combined with the option of voicing
disagreements in public, which requires ministers to explain and justify their EU policies in
public, as in the UK; (iii) and close direct contacts with MEPs in order to reduce informational
disadvantages, as in Germany. Benz (2004) Benz (2004), therefore, suggests bottom-up mechanisms of
Europeanisation, in that MPs perceive of the EU as a new opportunity structure that allows alternative
usages.
Several authors note that institutional rights are worth little if they are not used and taken up by MPs.
Pollak and Slominski (2003: 708), for instance, argue that “unfortunately, most comparative studies on the
role of national parliaments focus on the description of what parliaments can do (i.e. their formal rights)
rather than on what they really do”. Examining the Austrian parliament, they try to identify dimensions
that may hamper adequate control, despite strong constitutional safeguards. They explore five dimensions
of the use of the legal powers: motions tabled, motions made binding, documents submitted to parliament,
meetings of the main committee, and interaction of parliamentary groups in the committees. They find,
inter alia, that the number of binding opinions on the Austrian ministers has declined sharply
since the mid-1990s; over time, fewer and fewer motions have been passed; and in terms of
information the parliament is flooded with documents that it is unable to process effectively.
As a consequence, the European Affairs Committee concentrates on key events such as the
preparation of IGCs or summits. Similarly, Hegeland and Neuhold (2002) emphasise that the
EAC and the EU-related mandate are simply tools of control, whose importance should not be
exaggerated. In their comparative analysis of Finland, Sweden and Austria, they note that
the selection mechanism for the processing of information is central to the control capacity of
parliaments.
To what degree and in what ways formal parliamentary powers are used may depend in part on MPs’
role orientations and attitudes towards European integration. Wessels (2005) has examined the extent to
which conceptions of democracy vary in 11 European countries, the evaluation of European democracy by
MPs and the changes in role orientations over time. He finds that there is a considerable degree
of diversity in the understanding of democracy in the countries under study, with some MPs
emphasising the “governance function” and others the “representation function”. The same picture of
diversity applies to the evaluation of European democracy. Finally, he compares the attitudes and
contacts of German MPs over time (between 1996 and 2003) and argues that they adapt and
change only very slowly. He concludes that MPs have actually been very slow adaptors, since
during the same period there was a massive increase in the amount of legislation that came from
Brussels. Wessels is, therefore, doubtful whether the new institutional powers will be taken up by
MPs, because they lack interest in, and understanding of, the EU and its importance. Thus,
Wessels (2005: 463) concludes that “national patterns can be expected to persist over a longer period of
time. Institutional change, incentives and improvements will most likely have a limited though
steady impact on national parliaments and their members. It is an open question whether this
identifiable impact will provoke adaptation at a sufficient rate to minimise the danger of declining
authority and relevance of national parliaments” (see also Cowley 2000 on British MPs attitudes to
Europe).
In sum, studies of behavioural and attitudinal adaptation to EU integration are not necessarily negative
on the powers of parliaments. Benz (2004) and Auel and Benz (2005), in particular, hint at the possibility
that parliaments may have consolidated their position in the national political system. Yet, the literature on
actors’ strategies and attitudes certainly indicates that it is insufficient to infer from formal institutional
adaptation to actual parliamentary influence.
When it comes to identifying the determinants of parliamentary responses to EU integration, studies have
increasingly come to rely on comparative designs, as single-country discussions are complemented by
comparative small N or medium N studies that comprise two (Hansen and Scholl 2002), three
(Dimitrakopoulos 2001; Hegeland and Neuhold 2002), four (Holzhacker 2005), or the EU-15 countries
(Bergman 1997, 2000; Raunio 2005a; Saalfeld 2005). Generally, the Nordic and North-Western EU
countries remain over-represented in the small N studies, although the first studies that include both
countries from the EU 15 and the new Central and Eastern European member states are now beginning to
appear (O’Brennan and Raunio 2007).
In terms of explanatory methods, we find a good deal of variation. Many (comparative) case studies use
process-tracing techniques (e.g., Dimitrakopoulos 2001; Holzhacker 2002) or classic small N techniques,
such as the most-similar to most-different systems design. Raunio (2005a) applies Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA), especially Ragin’s 2000 fuzzy-set methodology, which allows him to identify necessary and
sufficient conditions, while conceptualising his variables at the ordinal level of measurement. Wessels (2005)
and Saalfeld (2005) use quantitative techniques, but in the case of Saalfeld this generates insignificant
results due to the small number of cases, which suggests that a within-unit analysis at a lower
level of aggregation or simply another unit of analysis is necessary to use quantitative results
effectively.
Third, explanations of institutional adaptation cover the range of neo-institutionalist approaches in
political science. Dimitrakopoulos (2001), for instance, adopts a historical-sociological institutionalist
perspective to explain institutional change in Greece, France and the UK. Hansen and Scholl (2002) apply
Börzel and Risse’s (2000) approach to Europeanisation and distinguish between rational choice
institutionalist and sociological perspectives to explain the institutional adaptation in Germany and the
UK. Saalfeld (2005) and Raunio and Hix (2000) rely on rational choice approaches, notably informational
theories of legislative choice, which were originally developed for the study of the US Congress. Other
rational choice perspectives include Orr (2003) and Pahre (1997) . Most studies are not, however, very
explicit in the choice of their theoretical assumptions.
Fourth, and following on closely from the previous point, explanations of institutional adaptation have emphasised domestic variables that are well known from comparative politics and government. In particular, studies have underlined the importance of the prevalent type of government in a particular country, which determines the influence of opposition parties and of governing parties’ backbenchers, the modes of executive-legislative relations and thus the level of parliamentary influence irrespective of EU integration. Public opinion on EU integration has also been noted as an important (bottom-up) determinant of levels of parliamentary control, as have ‘critical junctures’ in the sense of particular EU events (accession, treaty revision, etc.) and historically contingent political constellations (see below).
Raunio and Hix (2000) have argued that the EU has provided a catalyst for domestic institutional reforms. Institutional adaptation resulted from the pressure of (i) opposition parties and (ii) governing parties’ backbenchers to gain access to EU related information. Holzhacker (2005) concludes that parliamentary power in the area of EU affairs scrutiny is dependent on the type of government with minority governments producing stronger parliamentary scrutiny than coalition governments; in turn, the latter are more conducive to parliamentary scrutiny than single-party majority governments. He, therefore, effectively attributes tighter scrutiny procedures to the power of opposition parties over policy-making. Yet, he makes no special reference to the EU and how it interacts with the domestic variables. EU affairs effectively seem to be just another policy area under more or less parliamentary control.
Bergman (1997), in one of the first comparative studies of institutional adaptation, included five
explanatory factors: (i) the power of parliaments, (ii) political culture/traditions, (iii) federalism, (iv)
minority government, (v) and evidence of strategic action. He concluded that political culture measured
along a North-South division could explain much of the variation in parliamentary scrutiny procedures.
Moreover, he argued that one of the control variables, namely, the timing of accession, was associated with
tighter parliamentary control.
Raunio (2005a) in his EU-15 study includes (i) the role of parliaments independent of EU integration,
(ii) public opinion on EU integration, (iii) party positions on EU integration (Euroscepticism), (iv) minority
government status and (v) political culture, referred to as Catholic versus non-Catholic proportions of the
population. He finds in his qualitative medium N study that tighter scrutiny procedures are implemented if
parliaments are stronger regardless of integration and if the public is more Eurosceptic. A strong parliament
is a necessary condition for tight scrutiny and a strong parliament together with a Eurosceptic public are
sufficient conditions for tight scrutiny. He thus allows for bottom-up processes of adaptation, in
that public Euroscepticism serves as an incentive for MPs to tighten control in the area of EU
affairs.
In a similar vein, Saalfeld (2005) has examined four factors, including (i) intra-party conflicts, (ii)
coalition government, (iii) minority government, and (iv) the salience of EU membership. He applies
quantitative techniques and finds that all four factors point in the right direction, but are not
significant. His arguments are based on the application of rational choice delegation studies
and suggest, in a nutshell, that the level of parliamentary scrutiny is a function of the level
of trust between backbenchers of governing parties and government ministers. The level of
scrutiny should, therefore, be higher the more risky the delegation of policy-making discretion for
backbenchers to ministers. Under conditions of coalition government, this risk increases and under
conditions of minority government, the risk of shirking by ministers is even higher. He, therefore,
comes back to something that we have long known: the type of government shapes the power of
parliament.
There is also an interesting discussion surrounding the impact of the timing of accession to the EU. As
discussed above, Bergman (1997) found this factor to be relevant, as does Saalfeld (2005). The latter does
not test the ‘timing factor’, but applies it as an indicator for the salience of EU integration. He
assumes that a later point of accession increases the contentiousness of EU integration, for
instance, due to the larger acquis and a concomintantly higher degree of adaptive pressures.
Raunio (2005a), by contrast, omits the timing factor, because in his view, it is obvious that
parliaments adopted tighter scrutiny procedures in the 1990s because the EU by then was much
more powerful than from the 1950s to the early 1980s. Moreover, historical institutionalist
approaches quite naturally attach greater importance to temporal factors. Dimitrakopoulos (2001),
for instance, refers to the importance of EU accession for reforms in the UK. However, in the
Greek case, institutional adaptation lagged behind accession to the EU by almost ten years,
suggesting that the timing of accession is not necessarily a critical juncture for institutional reforms,
but requires other conditions to be met. Moreover, in the case of France, it took European
elections in 1979 to institutionalise the tools for the scrutiny of government in the area of EU
affairs.
The moment of accession is also stressed in explanations of individual institutional reforms, such as the
mandate in Austria and Denmark. In Austria, the mandate is traced to the need of the then governing
grand coalition to secure a qualified majority for the constitutional changes associated with EU accession.
The mandate was a way to buy off the opposition parties (Pollak and Slominski 2003). In Denmark, the
mandate was the result of the early post-accession period, when the then Agriculture Minister failed to
secure a beneficial deal for Denmark, leading MPs to demand a binding voting instruction for the next
negotiations in Brussels (Raunio 2005a). Both explanations point towards the combination of
temporal external and domestic political and constitutional constellations as key mechanisms of
adaptation.
A very similar conclusion emerges from studies of behavioural Europeanisation. Both Pollak and Slominski (2003) and Hegeland and Neuhold (2002) emphasise domestic political constellations. They argue, for instance, that by the time the Austrian government no longer needed a two-thirds majority for constitutional changes in the context of accession and especially after the end of the grand coalition, the Austrian parliament went into an inter-party mode and EU affairs were effectively absorbed into the domestic political game. A similar argument is raised by Holzhacker (2002), who points out that as EU integration moved out of the traditionally non-conflictual foreign policy field and as MPs and parties realised that many policies are affected by the EU, they switched into an inter-party mode, which largely domesticated the parliamentary control of EU affairs.
As one might expect, the ongoing debate over the impact of European integration on national parliaments
has been marked by growing differentiation over time and it mirrors changes in the integration process. In
fact, widening – the accession of new countries to the EU – and changes in EU integration largely fuel the
debate. Thus, e.g., several recent papers (Cooper 2006; Cygan 2004; Fraga 2005; Raunio 2005b) have
examined the potential impact of the draft Constitution on the position of national parliaments. Similarly,
the increasing importance of soft law and policy-making mechanisms such as OMC have been identified as
important influences on national parliaments (Duina and Raunio 2007). Duina and Oliver (2005) have
highlighted their potential as a source of parliamentary empowerment through policy transfer; by
contrast, Duina and Raunio (2007) emphasise “contradictory effects”: OMC further privileges
executives and risks marginalizing parliaments, but it also improves the knowledge bases of national
MPs.
Although changes in integration as marked by Treaty revisions, ‘interstitial institutional change’ (Farrell and Héritier 2007) or the spread of new policy modes provide rich justification for revisiting and, perhaps, revising long-established arguments regarding the European effect on national parliaments, there is rarely much explicit discussion of ‘Europe’ as an ‘independent variable’. Some (Auel 2005) equate it with treaties and declarations, accessions, summits, and EU institutions; some emphasise the influence of the European Parliament, in particular (Neunreither 2005); still others (Benz 2004) conceptualise the EU as a new opportunity structure for national MPs. With such diversity in the assumed driver of domestic responses, it is not surprising that different authors come to very different conclusions about response patterns.
Finally, the range of parliamentary responses that have so far been studied systematically remains quite narrow. Thus, we still know little about the EU impact on interpellations, questions, plenary debates, party cohesion and discipline, delegation patterns to committees, processes within committees or parliamentarians’ relations to their constituencies. Considered against the backdrop of mainstream legislative studies, many key questions still remain to be asked.
In contrast to students of legislatures, analysts of the Europeanisation of national executives seem to be
universally agreed that European integration has implied “a shift in the internal national balance of powers
towards governments and administrations” (Wessels, Maurer, and Mittag 2003: xvi; emphasised in the
original). What is much less clear is how power relationships within national executives – notably
between the political and the administrative parts of the executive and between ministries and the
centre of government – have been affected (Goetz 2000). There are arguments to suggest both
bureaucratisation, based on the predominance of unelected officials in the European policy
process, and politicisation, as ministers and heads of government devote increasing time and
attention to EU-related business. Similarly, whilst some observers equate Europeanisation with
centralisation in national governments and administrations – as evidenced by the growth of an “EU
core executive” and “prime ministerialisation”, others note the growing diffusion of EU-related
powers and responsibilities across the range of ministries in the capitals of the EU member
states.
The very intensive engagement of national officials in EU policy-making is well documented (e.g., Wessels,
Maurer, and Mittag 2003) as are the socialising effects of regular participation in EU policy-making bodies
– e.g., Council working groups – on national officials (e.g., Beyers 1998, 2005; Beyers and
Trondal 2004; Lewis 2005; for a recent critical overview see Quaglia, De Francesco, and Radaelli 2008).
Work centred on the emergence of a ‘European administrative space’ and accounts of the emergence of a
“multi-level Union administration“, thought to hail a “transformation of executive politics in Europe“
(Egeberg 2006; see also Curtin and Egeberg 2008) stress the central position of national ministerial officials
throughout the EU policy cycle. The oft-noted executive dominance in EU affairs is, thus, tantamount to
administrative dominance.
Lægreid, Steinthorsson, and Thorhallsson (2004) note that the political leadership is more involved in
policy-making in EU states than in non-EU states such as Norway and Iceland, but that officials usually do
not have enough time to clear policy issues with the political leadership and that volume of EU business
and time pressures prevent them from involving the political leadership. This latter point is further
supported by their finding that, overall, the political leadership is more involved in non-EU related policies
than in EU-related policies.
In addition to references to the sheer volume of EU-related business and the fact that elected executive politicians are, of course, greatly outnumbered by bureaucrats, some arguments found in the literature also point to a discretionary loss of political steering and control. Thus, with specific reference to the German Federal ministerial administration, Goetz (2003) has argued that whilst the administrative parts of the executive are, indeed, part of an integrated multi-level system, European integration promotes a bifurcated government. Governing takes place at both national and EU levels, but the two governing levels are much less closely connected than along the administrative dimension. Key governing features – notably party, coalition and parliamentary government – show few signs of Europeanisation. Whilst national administrators increasingly become multi-level players, executive politicians also play at different levels, but rarely in the sense of a linked ‘two-level game’. And whilst the EU offers national administrators many incentives for the national usage of Europe, these incentives are weaker for executive politicians, whose party-based career paths are hardly affected by Europe.
Whether bureaucrats are amongst the domestic winners of integration will at least in part depend on
power relationships at EU level. Thus, Larsson and Trondal (2005), with reference to Norwegian and
Swedish examples, argue that the interactions between the Commission and national ministerial
administrations activate/mobilise primarily the working level of ministries. “By contrast, the Council of
Ministers arguably strengthens domestic politico-administrative leadership, the Foreign Office and the
Prime Minister’s Office” Larsson and Trondal (2005: 3). Thus, a more intergovernmental policy process
may advantage the political leadership, whilst a supranational process, centred on the Commission, may
work to the benefit of line officials.
The emphasis on bureaucratisation found in much of the Europeanisation literature stands in contrast to
an influential strand of discussion in Comparative Public Administration, which suggests that Western
European bureaucracies have been subject to growing functional politicisation over the last two decades or
so (Page and Wright 1999, 2007; Peters and Pierre 2001, 2004), as the capacity of elected politicians to
monitor, steer and control the behaviour of unelected officials has increased. European integration as a
potential explanation of growing politicisation does not feature prominently in these accounts, which tend
to emphasise, instead, the rise of cartel parties (Katz and Mair 1995), which insert themselves deeply in
the institutions of the state, and, in particular, the impact of the ‘new public management’
(Peters and Pierre 2001, 2004). Thus, it has been noted that the attempt to let managers
manage appears to imply a de-politicisation of public administration (e.g., Hood 1995) and does,
indeed, initially lead to loss of political control, but that this loss of direct control is likely to be
compensated for by increasing political control over managerial appointments (e.g., Hood and
Lodge 2006; Maor 1999).
Executive Europeanisation has often been associated with dual centralisation (for detailed overviews see
Goetz 2000 and, most recently, Laffan 2007 and Trondal 2007). This centralisation is said
to be observable at two interconnected levels: an administrative level, in the form of an ‘EU
core executive’; and at the political level, through the strengthening of a small number of key
ministers and, in particular, heads of government, who are supported by the EU core executive
institutions. The strengthened role of Prime Ministers as a result of EU integration was highlighted by
King (1994) in the context of a broader study of heads of government. He argued that there was
trend towards an enhanced role for prime ministers due to the growing role of ‘summitry’,
including EU summits. This position was echoed by Rhodes, Ferrera, and Hemerijck (2000)
who identified EU integration as a key force behind the centralisation of core executives in
Europe.
Work that has been more narrowly focused on the EU effect has underlined this conclusion. Thus, Mittag and Wessels (2003: 424–434) note as result of their 15-country comparison:
“In all Member States of the European Union, prime ministers or chancellors, as the heads of government, have become key actors in EU affairs (…). Given the need to act assertively and coherently in making key decisions, which are increasingly taken through the European Council, prime ministers have gained power vis-à-vis their ministerial colleagues”.
Kassim (2000, 2003), who focuses on policy co-ordination, likewise identifies a growing role for
heads of governments as a key trend in EU policy co-ordination. As one might expect, many
authors qualify this general assessment to some extent. Thus, it has been noted, e.g., that next to
heads of governments and their offices, finance ministries, too, have benefited from progressive
integration, notably since “the net effect of EMU has been to strengthen the domestic power of
finance ministries over structural economic reforms” (Dyson 2002: 16). This has, e.g., been
evident in Germany, where a major shift in EU-related powers from the Ministry of Economics
to the Ministry of Finance has been identified as a “caesura“ (Bulmer and Burch 2000: 277)
in the institutional setup for EU policy-making in the Federal administration (although key
competences were shifted back to the Economics Ministry following the Federal elections of
2005).
Others have noted that the EU policy process may not uniformly favour centralisation. Thus, as noted
above, Larsson and Trondal (2005) have pointed out that the Council strengthens the political leadership of
the national executive and the centre(s) of executive decision-making, while the Commission strengthens the
lower echelons of professional civil servants in the national line ministries. In the absence of close links
between the Council and the Norwegian administration, integration contributes to sectorisation and
de-hierarchisation in the Norwegian administration. By contrast, the sectorisation push in the Swedish
administration is counter-balanced by the co-ordination pull from the centre, including the prime minister’s
office and the foreign ministry. These findings chime with Egeberg’s (1999) earlier argument that
participation in the Council working groups invokes stronger loyalties of national officials in support of their
national governments, whilst participation in Commission working groups invokes a stronger sense of
loyalty along sectoral and functional lines. The Commission, therefore, has the potential to
contribute to fragmentation and segmentation in national governments. Studies of Germany
(Derlien 2000) or the Netherlands (Harmsen 1999) have likewise found evidence of persistent,
if not in fact, increasing sectorisation rather than centralisation as a consequence of further
integration.
Still others have found that the trend towards prime ministerialisation, whilst evident in some countries,
is by no means uniform. Thus, Laffan’s (2006) study of core executive adaptation to the EU in Ireland,
Greece and Finland, points out that although one can identify two basic co-ordination models, prime
ministerial or foreign ministry-led, there is no clear evidence of progressive convergence towards the
former.
As Laffan (2007) has noted, much work on executive Europeanisation, whether focused on one or two
dimensions, such as patterns of interministerial co-ordination or the socialisation of officials, or more
broad-ranging in its empirical scope, is guided by the overarching question of whether integration is
associated with cross-national convergence in executive arrangements (see also Page and Wouters 1995).
She suggests that “the dominant conclusion found in the existing literature on executive adaptation points
to the continuing diversity of domestic responses to EU engagement“ (Laffan 2007: 136). In a similar
vein, Olsen (2007: 239), on the basis of a review of much of the relevant literature, concludes
that
“While there are competing interpretations, the main findings (although with many nuances) are, first, that ,Europe matters’ and second, that there is domestic persistence and enduring diversity (...). There has been no general trend towards isomorphism and no significant convergence towards a common institutional model homogenizing the domestic structures of the European states (...) established domestic patterns have been resilient but also flexible enough to cope with changes at the European level, and no new and unified model of dealing with Union matters has emerged. In general, EU arrangements have turned out to be compatible with the maintenance of distinct national institutional arrangements and there are even cases of reconfirmation and restoration of established national structures and processes.“
Proponents of convergence are in the minority (Albert-Roulhac 1998; Burnham and
Maor 1995; Cardona 1999; SIGMA 1999), whilst continued diversity within the EU-15 and now EU-27 is
stressed by many (Bossaert et al. 2001; Harmsen 1999; Olsen 2003; Page 2003; Page and
Wouters 1995; Siedentopf and Speer 2003; Spanou 1998).
Lack of convergence does not, of course, imply absence of change. But change is rarely seen to
challenge basic administrative traditions. Studies of Southern European executives, for instance,
have tended to emphasise the resilience of informal rules, norms and cultures as opposed to
more adaptable formal structures (e.g., Aguilar-Fernández 2003; Spanou 1998). Conversely,
Lægreid, Steinthorsson, and Thorhallsson (2004), who examine the Europeanisation of central
administrations in the Nordic states, and Adshead (2005) in her study of governance in Ireland,
emphasise stable formal executive structures, but observe adaptation of “informal norms and
cultures” as well as “external networks” (Lægreid, Steinthorsson, and Thorhallsson 2004); and of
“rules and procedures” as well as broad “cultures” of officials and the interaction of society
and public administration (Adshead 2005). More generally, studies that concentrate on formal
institutional structures tend to highlight resilience (Bulmer and Burch 1998), whereas analyses of the
‘software’ of the executive – cultural norms, values, assumptions, roles and identities of officials –
underline the transformative power of Europe (Jordan 2002, 2003 provides a paradigmatic
case).
Studies that focus tightly on national EU policy co-ordination (e.g., Albert-Roulhac 1998; Kassim, Peters, and Wright 2000