List of Footnotes

1		The European Union includes 27 member states as of March 2008: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
2		This underscores one branch of investigation, mainly the role of national political values, such as nationalism, in affecting EU support. This is discussed in greater detail below.
3		Structure is the manifestation of the democratic rules, institutions, and norms. Process is ability to participate in the democratic political order.
4		“Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good or bad?” was the core question regarding support for the European Union. The ‘Common Market’ in this question has also been the ‘European Economic Community’, the ‘European Community’, and the ‘European Union’.
5		The Eurobarometer series was not the only one. The European Elections Studies series and the World Values Surveys as well grew in complexity to accommodate this growing interest.
6		Despite this complexity, we allow common sense to rule the day and readers are encouraged to attend to the sub-field variation in conceptualization and operationalization of the dependent (as well as independent) variables as this remains a large and growing field of inquiry. When authors have uncommonly operationalized indicators, we have tried to make a note of it in the Living Review below.
7		Although we have included a relevant Section 3.3 below, we do not focus on the media given that another Living Review article discusses this literature (de Vreese 2007 ).
8		For a multi-level process, Brinegar and Jolly (2005 ) argue that lower skilled workers are more averse to EU, but this depends on the nature of national redistribution and capitalist systems.
9		Human capital is argued to also have a gender component as women are less interested in foreign policy, more compassionate and display less competitive values, more economically vulnerable to economic integration (Nelson and Guth 2000 ) and women are the likely ‘losers’ from market liberalization because of their position in the labor market (Gelleny and Anderson 2000 ). This is discussed further below.
10		The Three Pillars divide EU policy considerations and their responsible bodies among three domains. The ‘Community’ domain covers most of the common policies, where decisions are taken by the Commission, Parliament and the Council. The ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ domain deals with issues of common security for which decisions are taken by the Council alone. The ‘Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’ domain takes up issues with intra-EU enforcement where the Council makes the decisions. These changes are contingent on the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty.
11		Schmitt and Thomassen (2000 : 319) argue that, depending on the policy area concerned, EU governance shifts between inter-governmental and supra-national mode, and does so with laws in an increasing breadth of influence. This principle has further received empirical support for the EU project as the distribution of political authority over differentiated policy areas may be more efficient than blanket centralization (Hooghe and Marks 2003 ).
12		At the aggregate level of public opinion, nationality or national cultural heritage is important through long-established political traditions or national specific cultural legacies (Gabel 1998a ; Bosch and Newton 1995 ; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993 ; Smith and Wanke 1993 ). Unfortunately, the notion of ‘national context’ does little to pull back the curtain on underlying complexities; although, one author has linked aggregate support with significant moments in EU history, particularly the emergence of treaties (Çíftçí 2005 ) thereby implying a relationship between the EU policy process and support.
13		However, their argument for the role of national identity is not based on a direct testing of national sentiments (specifying it within the model) but rather on the variation in the size of country dummies coefficients.
14		As examples, the EU has issued a European model of passport (in use since 1985), has an anthem (Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy”) and a flag (a circle of 12 golden stars on a blue background), and even EU model driving licenses (since 1996).
15		As one example, the institutional impact of national-level variations in electoral laws and coordination with EU level elections advantages some countries such that countries are represented disproportionately at the EU-level (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999 ).
16		However, they do offer a loose definition of political representation as the concept of representative democracy, including both the institutions of responsible government and the process of political representation (Schmitt and Thomassen 1999 : 4).Regardless, this problem persists via the issue of an identifiable European demos (see Section 2.3).
17		It also refers to the ability of the European executive to avoid accountability to the EP, including Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) of the Council of Ministers and the secrecy of their deliberations (Katz 2001 : 55).
18		Gibson and Caldeira (1995 , 1998 ) add the European Court of Justice as an EU institution other than the EP as another potential source for continuing perceptions of low legitimacy.
19		Anderson (1998 ) further undermined a central assumption by taking a cognitive approach arguing that on nearly all measures of awareness and knowledge about integration, most people are uniformed across nearly all measures of knowledge and awareness about the basic aspects of the integration process, ultimately undermining their ability to employ proxies as a means to arrive at an opinion of the EU.
20		To many, the results of Maastricht profoundly re-orientated the trajectory of the EU. It laid the basis for a common foreign and security policy, closer cooperation on justice and home affairs and the creation of an economic and monetary union, including a single currency. It further introduced the principle of subsidiarity and the Pillar system of policy formation. Even the name – the European Economic Community – was changed to the European Community, suggesting of the changing nature of the project.
21		Flickinger (1994 ) in contrast shows strong mobilizing effects of parties while controlling for media effects in Britain.
22		There are several country and sub-regional studies. Examples include: Poland: Bielasiak 2002 ; the Baltics: Ehin 2001 ; Slovenia: Adam, Hafner-Fink, and Uhan 2002 .
23		Their use of 13 candidate countries (including Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) also demonstrated negative correlation between the relative importance of agriculture in domestic employment and aggregate support.
24		This period, like the present one, was also filled with concerns of the question of expansion.