List of Footnotes

1		Fritz Scharpf neatly explains the output- and input-oriented dimensions of democratic government: “[The democratic] legitimacy of political systems has come to depend […] on the belief in, and the practice of, democratic self-determination which must assure that government of the people must also be government by the people and for the people” (Scharpf 1999 : 1, emphasis added). This led to a distinction of two dimensions of democratic self-determination: input-oriented authenticity (government by the people) and output-oriented effectiveness (government for the people) (Scharpf 1999 : 2).
2		A retrieval (in April 2007) for “civil society” and “EU” in the Social Science Citation Index results in a list of 45 articles. Only 3 of them were published before 2000.
3		The Economic and Social Committee as institutionalised representation of societal interests has also attempted to claim the civil society discourse and its legitimizing connotations (Smismans 2003 ).
4		The distinction between special and diffuse interests points to differences in resource endowment, and mobilization capacity across different types of interests. This is an aspect I will further pursue in Section 2.2. Other authors refer to private and public interests (Ruzza 2002 ) to categorize different types of societal actors.
5		Justin Greenwood has recently published an article with a similar thrust in the British Journal of Political Science. He has developed a concept for categorizing the literature on “Organized Civil Society and Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union” which provides a different view on a similar body of literature (Greenwood 2007 ).
6		They point out that the number of articles on EU governance listed in the Social Science Citation Index SSCI has increased from about 10 articles per year in the mid-1990s to 40-50 articles per year in the early 2000s (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006 : 27).
7		For a more detailed account and in depth analysis of different governance approaches see Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2006 ); Jachtenfuchs (2001 ); Pierre and Peters (2000 ).
8		See Greven (2007 ) for an articulate normative critique of functional approaches to participation.
9		Earlier research on interest groups at the national level had, in contrast, often been dominated by a rather sceptical view of “pressure groups” and their impact on policy-making. This is particularly true for the German research tradition which has drawn on Theodor Eschenburg’s famous study on the power of associations throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Eschenburg 1955 ).
10		See a forthcoming Living Review on “Interest Groups in EU Policy Making” for this purpose (Eising ).
11		There are authors who employ classical accounts of civil society to categorize the involvement of civil society in EU governance (see Knodt 2005 ; Richter 1997 ).
12		In this respect, Benjamin Barber takes a particularly explicit standpoint when looking for the societal conditions of participatory democracy: “Without loyalty, fraternity, patriotism, bonding, tradition, mutual affection, and common belief, participatory democracy is reduced to crass proceduralism” (Barber 1984 : 242).
13		Different forms of cooperation with varying degrees of institutionalization have developed across different Western industrial states. For example, while movement activists such as advocates of environmental or women’s issues have established highly professional lobbying organizations in the United States, these causes have been absorbed by the political party system in France or Germany (see della Porta et al. 1999 ).
14		The contributions document the dialogue between experts and practitioners which was organized by the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission.
15		The terminology employed by the Commission accordingly shifted from “special interests” towards “voluntary organisations” and “NGOs” throughout the 1990s (EC 1992 , 1997 , 2000 ; see also Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007 ).
16		A “Social Dialogue” with the social partners was established as integral part of EU decision-making in social policy by the 1987 Single European Act (see Smismans 2004 : 315–399).
17		The importance of “civil society” was further underlined by introducing the principle of “Participatory Democracy” in the EU Constitutional Treaty.
18		Article I-47 of the Constitutional Treaty does in fact not only subsume the involvement of civil society under participatory democracy but also elements of direct democracy such as the introduction of a citizens’ initiative.
19		See Living Review on the emergence of a European public sphere (de Vreese 2007 ).
20		See Dunkerley and Fudge (2004 ) suggesting “a more discursive engagement with the citizens of Europe” to increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU.
21		Deliberative democracy is explored from different angles and in different research projects at the ARENA Center of European Studies, University of Olso by an international team of scholars including Erik O. Eriksen, John Erik Fossum, and Hans-Joerg Trenz (publications at http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/).
22		For a critical analysis of the constitutional convention’s deliberative quality compare Göler (2006 ).
23		However, it has been argued that societal conditions in modern nation states would not meet these standards of political community either (see Habermas 1999 ; Weiler et al. 1995 ).
24		This approach has not only been transferred to the EU but has, more generally, been applied to global politics and the emergence of transnational and/or global civil society. This mainly includes authors who highlight transnational communication and/or international law as fundament of an emerging transnational civil society (see Dryzek 1999 ; Linklater 1990 ; Luard 1990 ); (compare Nanz and Steffek 2006 ; Finke 2005 ).
25		A forthcoming volume edited by Bruno Jobert and Beate Kohler-Koch will give us a flavour of the broad range of national discourses on civil society (Jobert and Kohler-Koch 2008 ).