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Many of the functions scholars of EU affairs have assigned to civil society in EU governance are, in fact,
informed by theories of deliberative democracy, sometimes independently of the terminology authors employ.
Deliberative democracy explores the link between political decision-making and deliberations in the public
sphere.19
The effectiveness of this link provides for democratic legitimacy because it introduces themes and issues
discussed in society to the political system, and it forces political decision-makers to justify their decisions
by reference to the common good (Habermas 1996
).
A functioning public sphere depends on a specific societal infrastructure which is provided by civil
society and safeguarded by the individual’s civil rights. Jürgen Habermas, who is one of the most
prominent advocates of deliberative democracy, contends that the institutional core of civil society
“comprises those non-governmental and non-economic connections and voluntary associations that anchor
the communication structures of the public sphere in the society component of the ‘lifeworld’. Civil society
is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that
[…] distil and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere” (Habermas 1996:
367).
Authors who are concerned with civil society and its contribution to deliberation, transparency,
contestation, and the emergence of a European public sphere can be associated with theories of deliberative
democracy. Olivier De Schutter, for instance, who addresses the “promise of participatory democracy” in
his account of civil society in EU governance, actually invokes deliberative democracy. He maintains that
interest groups and citizens’ initiatives “participate in public information and communication
processes, so helping to create a general perception of the common good” (De Schutter 2002:
202).20
Deirdre Curtin refers to the same concept when assigning civil society the function
of establishing a space for the public deliberation of values and policies (Curtin 2003:
55). And Erik O. Eriksen, one of the most articulate proponents of deliberative
democracy,21
argues that democracy at the level of the EU requires a “single overarching communicative space accessible
for all, in which proponents and opponents can voice and justify opinions and claims, and mobilize support
in order to sluice them into decision-making units via social movements and political parties”
(Eriksen 2005: 355; see Eriksen 2006; Fossum and Trenz 2006).
The ‘convention method’ which was not only employed for the drafting of the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights (2000) but also for the elaboration of the EU Constitutional Treaty (2004) has
particularly attracted the attention of proponents of deliberative democracy and civil society involvement in
EU governance. Olivier De Schutter argues that the Charter of Fundamental Rights was drafted in a
convention of “unprecedented openness” (De Schutter 2002: 199). The charter convention invited outside
contributions which were published on a website and involved civil society organizations in public hearings.
Both led to “an authentically European-wide debate among the organizations of the civil society”
(De Schutter 2002: 199) and lead Olivier De Schutter to characterize the convention as a successful
“experiment in deliberative democracy”. However, he also maintains that this success is partly due to
the simplicity of the issues raised by the drafting of a Charter of Rights (De Schutter 2002:
198–199).22
John Erik Fossum and Hans-Jörg Trenz (2006) have, more generally, analyzed EU constitution-making
in terms of its contribution to the building of what they call a “social constituency”. They argue that the
introduction of participatory procedures into European governance in general and – via conventions and
referenda – particularly into constitution-making has opened a space for societal contention which might
constrain further institutional choices. The authors maintain that this should draw our attention to the
concepts of European public sphere and European civil society “as the intermediary spaces of
communication and mobilization which link institutional performance back to popular concerns and
expectations” (Fossum and Trenz 2006: 58). The authors thus tie deliberative democracy and questions of
democratic legitimacy to research on new social movements and contentious politics (Fossum and
Trenz 2006: 60–61) and highlight the need to “conceive of collective actors as constituents of a new polity”
(Fossum and Trenz 2006: 64). Authors who draw on deliberative democracy focus on civil
society actors’ autonomy and their contribution to the emergence of an independent public
sphere.
| New Social Movement Research
Research on social movements, which I already addressed in Section 2.2, due to its overlaps with interest group research, also alludes to deliberative democracy. It may hence be not by accident that Erik O. Eriksen (2005: 355) addresses “social movements” in his quote (see above). Social movement research has been concerned with political contestation. Political contestation, for its part, can be considered as an important contribution to the politicization of EU related issues and the emergence of a European public sphere. Research on new social movement was initiated by the rise of citizens’ activism on issues such as environment, abortion, and disarmament in the 1970s. It gained momentum in the 1980s when it was advocated by political theorists with a normative focus on democratic legitimacy (Offe 1985; Eder 1985). Throughout the 1990s, however, new social movement researchers were motivated by an explanatory interest in the conditions of political mobilization (see Koopmans 1996; Tarrow 1991; Kriesi 1987). But when proponents of this approach shifted their attention towards the EU level of politics at the end of the 1990s (della Porta 2007; Imig and Tarrow 2001), new research questions such as the emergence of a European public sphere (Kriesi et al. 2007; Koopmans and Erbe 2004) were formulated and opened new social movement research to deliberative concepts of legitimate European governance (see Fossum and Trenz 2006 : 60–61). |
). He analyzed them as “agents of political
socialization” and explored their function as providers of political education and experience
on EU affairs. This function is at the core of what he calls “Europeanizing civil society”. His
account of civil society organizations’ ability to assume a socializing function at the level of the
EU is, not surprisingly, rather pessimistic. Warleigh states that “although NGOs can score
highly on their ability to influence EU policy […] their internal governance is far too elitist to
allow supporters a role in shaping policies, campaigns and strategies” (Warleigh 2001: 635; see
Rek 2007; Chryssochoou 2002).
This account raises the question of agency: Who can provide the ability to gain political skills and
experiences in EU affairs if EU-level civil society organizations cannot assume this task? (Warleigh 2001:
621). Or, more generally: Can civil society be “Europeanized”? Why do we need a ‘European’ civil society?
And can this process be influenced by organizations and institutions at the level of the EU? These
questions will be addressed in the next section which will first look at the theoretical debate on
the prospectus of a transnational, European civil society, before it presents research tackling
the promises and limitations of EU institutions’ efforts to control the Europeanization of civil
society.
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