The European Commission has traditionally sought to involve societal stakeholders as experts in its
policy making. These efforts are due to the Commission’s exclusive right to initiate European policies, its
comparatively narrow base of resources, and the necessity to elicit consensual political solutions (see
Christiansen et al. 2003
: 2–3; Kohler-Koch 1996). The inclusion of citizens’ associations in EU policy
making was further stimulated by the extension of EU competences in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. This
drew new societal actors to the EU political system and attracted the attention of EU integration
researchers. Hence, the European Commission and its informal relations with different types of societal
stakeholders became a natural object of research on European governance. These stakeholders
range – depending on the changing policy competences of the Commission – from business
interests to the social partners, welfare organizations or consumer, women and environmental
groups.
The ‘participatory governance’ approach, which can be associated with this type of research, does not
invoke participatory democracy by demanding authentic governance ‘by the people’. It rather draws on
an output-oriented tradition of investigating citizens’ involvement in the EU in terms of its
contribution to effective political problem-solving (see Heinelt and Smith 2003; Grote and
Gbikpi 2002; Heinelt et al. 2002
; Van den Hove 2000). ‘Participatory governance’ reconciles
system effectiveness and citizens’ participation by invoking Charles Lindblom’s ‘intelligence
of democracy’ thesis (Lindblom 1965). Advocates of this approach argue that participation
supports system effectiveness because “it can help to overcome problems of implementation by
considering motives and by fostering the willingness of policy addressees to comply as well as through
the mobilization of the knowledge of those affected” (Gbikpi and Grote 2002: 23). From this
functional point of view, civil society participation is a necessary condition of system effectiveness
and the democratic legitimacy of a governance system is being gauged in terms of its output
(Heinelt 1998).
Drawing on this perception, Phillippe Schmitter suggests that the representatives of ‘collectivities’ that will be affected by a policy participate in the process of policy preparation and formulation. He introduces the notion of ‘holder’ to conceptualize citizens’ participation in EU governance: Holders are those persons or organizations that possess some quality or resource that entitles them to participate. The appropriate criterion for participation is chosen according to the substance of the problem to be solved (Schmitter 2002: 62–63). This conception defines participation in functional terms which means that citizens’ right to participate depends on the resources they introduce in the political process. Proponents of this conception aim at finding out “under what circumstances participatory governance leads to sustainable and innovative outcomes” (Heinelt et al. 2002: 3).
The edited volume of Thomas Christiansen and Simona Piattoni (Christiansen and Piattoni 2003) is
another, if less accentuated example of this type of research. Contributions in this volume focus on the
European Commission and its informal relations with citizens’ groups in different policy fields such as
environment, biotechnology, single market regulation, the EMU, agriculture or nuclear policy. The aim is to
give us a “broader picture of the Commission’s relations with interest groups, the role of networks in the EU
policy process and the implications these features have had for European governance” (Christiansen
et al. 2003
: 2). Most of the contributions in this volume are interested in the implications of informal
governance arrangements for efficiency and effectiveness. They thus focus on the EU Commission’s
information requirement and conceptualize interest groups as experts providing a specific kind of knowledge
to the EU Commission.
The editors argue that the involvement of interest groups and NGOs “aided the Commission in gauging the likely reception of future EU policies ‘on the ground’ – an important knowledge in a system of decentralized implementation where much of the success of EU policies would depend on voluntary acceptance and compliance rather than enforcement” (Christiansen et al. 2003: 2). This statement reflects Lindblom’s intelligence of democracy argument as presented by the proponents of participatory democracy. Aberrations to informal governance and interest group participation such as clientelism and nepotism generating corruption and fraud are first and foremost analyzed in functional terms as obstacles to effective governance (see Warner 2003), although legitimacy problems related to informal governance are also addressed in a discrete contribution (see Warleigh 2003).8
| The Third Sector Approach
Before I turn to interest group research as another output-oriented approach to citizens’ involvement in EU governance, I will briefly touch upon the third sector and non-profit organization terminology which is also invoked in the current debate on civil society and EU governance (see Zimmer and Freise 2006 |
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