Instruments and strategies

4 Instruments and strategies

The literature is in broad agreement that the 1990s have witnessed a major change in EU external policies: the establishment of conditionality, in particular political conditionality, as a core instrument. Before the 1990s, EU external relations had been notable for their apolitical content and for the principle not to interfere with the domestic systems of third countries. Since the beginnings of the 1990s, however, democracy, human rights and the rule of law have become “essential elements” in almost all EU agreements with third countries, as both an objective and a condition of the institutionalized relationship. In case of violation, the EU may suspend or terminate the agreement (Horng 2003 ). These goals were complemented later by “good governance”.

How did this policy change come about? It would certainly be insufficient to simply attribute political conditionality via domestic analogy to the constitutional values and norms of the EU, which had existed before and did not change at the beginning of the 1990s. Outside the EU, the changed external political environment after the wave of democratization in 1989/90 was the major influence. The wave of democratization not only strengthened the international legitimacy of liberal democracy but also increased the need to support new and fledgling democracies. This was complemented by the increasing acceptance, in development policy circles, that economic aid and conditionality were insufficient in the absence of political reforms and good governance. Inside the EU, the European Parliament was the major driving force. It could use the assent procedure for treaties with third countries, which had been introduced by the Single European Act (SEA), to press for political conditionality (Holland 2002 : 120; Smith 2001 ).

EU conditionality is generally described as “positive”. It uses “carrots” rather than “sticks” and is based on rewards rather than punishment or assistance (Holland 2002 : 132; Schimmelfennig 2005 ; Smith 2001 ; Youngs 2001a : 192). On the one hand, and in spite of the “essential elements” clause, no agreement with a third country has ever been suspended or terminated. According to Youngs, “in practice European policy was in no significant way based on the use of coercive measures”; the EU has shown “no notable propensity to impose punitive action directly in relation to democratic shortfalls”. “European policy-makers saw a more positive, incentives-based form of conditionality as more legitimate and potentially more effective” than the use of sticks (Youngs 2001a : 192). Below the level of treaty relationships, however, the EU did use the “stick”. Financial aid was withheld, reduced or suspended, and negotiations were delayed, in several cases (e.g. Nwobike 2005 ). On the other hand, “there is scant evidence of additional assistance to countries where things are improving” (Smith 2001 : 190).

Conditionality is not the only mechanism of Europeanization observed – not even in the field of democracy and human rights promotion. In his study of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and East Asia, Richard Youngs finds evidence for two rather different strategies: civil society support and socialization. On the one hand, the “profile of EU democracy assistance funding in the two regions suggested a bottom-up approach, oriented overwhelmingly to civil society support, and in particular human rights NGOs” (Youngs 2001a : 192; Youngs 2001b : 362). This is also true for Latin America where the EU has little leverage for using political conditionality and has sought to develop direct links with civil society actors (Grugel 2004 : 612).

On the other hand, “in light of the limits to positive and negative material measures, EU strategy was characterized by an aim to develop deeply institutionalized patterns of dialogue and co-operation as means of socializing political elites into a positive and consensual adherence to democratic norms”. The EU used “generally accepted cooperation over technical governance issues” in order to promote good governance and democracy indirectly (Youngs 2001a : 193, 195; 2001b : 363). According to Youngs, the socialization approach is designed to create opportunities for “imitation and demonstration effects” and starts with very modest expectations of introducing the vocabulary of democracy into domestic discourse and inducing elites to at least pay lip service to democracy (Youngs 2001b : 359). It is these strategies rather than political conditionality that bear evidence of a distinctive and innovative “European approach” to democracy promotion and have been “unduly overlooked” (Youngs 2001a : 192, 195). By contrast, the US approach to democracy promotion has been characterized by more “concrete intervention” and a “more top-down, politicized … assistance” focusing on the “formal procedural elements of democracy” (Youngs 2001b : 360, 363-364).

In sum, the Europeanization strategies identified by Youngs in the area of human rights and democracy competition match the most important mechanisms identified in the theoretical literature (see section 2 above): conditionality, (intergovernmental) socialization, and direct EU-society links (via transnational socialization and domestic empowerment). The next question is whether the literature on Europeanization beyond Europe also confirms the expectation of weak impact.