2 Theoretical perspectives

In general, the study of Europeanization beyond Europe could benefit from the entire range of theoretical approaches that have been developed and put forward for analyzing Europeanization in the member states (for a brief overview, see Bulmer 2007). Here, however, I will limit myself to three theoretical perspectives that have been used recently to analyze Europeanization beyond the borders of the EU – but mainly with regard to accession countries. All of them specify mechanisms of EU impact, and the conditions under which they operate and are effective, as building blocks for a theory of Europeanization.

(1) In their analysis of Europeanization in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005a) distinguish mechanisms of Europeanization according to two dimensions. On the one hand, Europeanization can be EU-driven or domestically driven. On the other hand, it can be driven by different institutional logics, the “logic of consequences” and the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989: 160-162). First, then, Europeanization can be driven by the EU according to the logic of consequences, that is by EU sanctions and rewards that change the cost-benefit calculations of the target state (external incentives model). The impact of external incentives increases with the size of net benefits and the clarity and credibility of EU conditionality. Second, Europeanization may be induced by social learning. Target states are persuaded to adopt EU rules if they consider these rules legitimate and if they identify themselves with the EU. Both mechanisms can either work through intergovernmental interactions (bargaining or persuasion) or through transnational processes via societal actors in the target state (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 11-12, 18). Finally, according to the lesson-drawing model, states turn to the EU as a result of dissatisfaction with the domestic status quo and adopt EU rules if they perceive them as solutions to their domestic problems (either based on instrumental calculations or based on the appropriateness of the EU solutions).

(2) In their study of the impact of the EU on border conflicts, Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert (Diez et al. 2006) also construct a two-by-two table to conceptualize four “pathways of EU impact”. On the one hand, they distinguish pathways according to “whether the impact is generated by concrete EU measures or an effect of integration processes that are not directly influenced by EU actors” (Diez et al. 2006: 571). On the other hand, the impact can be on concrete policies or have wider social implications. The first pathway is “compulsory impact”, working through concrete measures, namely carrots and sticks, on concrete policies. The “connective impact” is established through concrete (mainly financial) measures establishing and supporting contact between the conflict parties. The other pathways work indirectly. According to the “enabling impact”, conflict actors strengthen their influence by linking their political agendas and positions to the EU. Finally, the “constructive impact” results in a fundamental reconstruction of identities as a result of exposure to European integration (Diez et al. 2006: 572-574).

(3) In a recent paper, Michael Bauer, Christoph Knill, and Diana Pitschel (Bauer et al. 2007) use the trichotomy of EU governance modes in regulatory policy – compliance, competition, and communication (Knill and Lenschow 2005) – to analyze domestic change in Central and Eastern Europe. Compliance is a coercive mechanism triggered by legally binding EU rules, which national administrations must implement in order to avoid sanctions. Whereas compliance is linked to “positive integration” and the formal harmonization of national rules, competition is related to “negative integration”, the abolition of national barriers distorting the common market. In this mode, the impact of the EU is less direct and works through market pressures rather than institutional sanctions. “Institutional change is stimulated by the need to improve the functional effectiveness of member states’ institutional arrangements in comparison to those of other participants within the common market.” (Bauer et al. 2007, in press) Finally, communication is defined as a governance mode that brings about change as a result of voluntary information exchange and mutual learning between national policy-makers in EU-sponsored networks. Rather than the direct sanctions of the EU or the indirect sanctions of the market, it is the legitimacy of policy models that drives Europeanization.

Obviously, there is considerable overlap between these conceptualizations. The classifications by Diez et al. and Bauer et al. implicitly distinguish between logics of action as well; in contrast to Bauer et al., Diez et al. and Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier distinguish between direct, EU-driven and indirect pathways of Europeanization; finally, all classifications emphasize that Europeanization may work through intergovernmental as well as transnational channels. Table 1 presents an attempt to map this conceptual overlap. It also shows the empty fields in the three categorizations, for which I suggest additional concepts.

The first mechanism of EU impact (1) is based on the direct, sanctioning impact of the EU on the target government and subsumes the intergovernmental channel of external incentives, the compulsory impact, and the compliance mode of governance. In EU relations with non-member states, this mechanism underlies the EU’s strategy of conditionality. In this field, the conceptual overlap among the three classifications is clearest so that it can serve as a starting point for discussing the other mechanisms.

The other mechanisms depart in various ways from the reference point of conditionality. Thus, at a general level, conditionality can be contrasted with lesson-drawing, domestic empowerment, and socialization. Lesson-drawing (2) is also based on the logic of consequences and on the impact of the EU on governments. But the impact is indirect, driven by external governments rather than the EU itself. Under the mode of governance of “communication”, however, lesson-drawing can also be encouraged by the EU (Bauer et al. 2007).

The mechanism of domestic empowerment (3) works directly but via societal actors or the anonymous market. The EU provides incentives for societal actors, or triggers processes of competition, which then change the cost-benefit assessments of the target government in the direction of Europeanization. In addition, societal actors can also draw lessons from the EU (4).

Finally, all of these mechanisms can work through a logic of appropriateness rather than consequences. “Communication” and “social learning” are conceived of as directly sponsored by the EU in order to trigger processes of persuasion and learning in governments beyond the EU (5). Conditionality is often contrasted with socialization along this dimension (Coppieters et al. 2004; Kelley 2004). Such processes can also be directed at societal actors (7) or driven by external governments (6) or societal actors (8). Broadly conceived, “communication” as a mode of governance, the EU’s “constructive impact”, and “social learning” cover the entire range of mechanisms based on the logic of appropriateness. The enabling impact more specifically describes the use of the EU and its policies and solutions by governmental and societal actors to add external legitimacy to their own political agenda (Diez et al. 2006: 573).

I suggest that these mechanisms could also be used fruitfully to theorize “Europeanization beyond the EU”. The question then is, under which conditions these mechanisms operate and are effective beyond the EU’s member and candidate states. None of the three studies generates high expectations of impact in this regard. According to the analyses in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005b), the impact of the EU in the candidate countries has mainly resulted from the external incentives of accession conditionality rather than social learning or lesson-drawing. Democratic conditionality ahead of the accession negotiations has worked best when countries had a credible promise of eventual membership and when the domestic power costs of adopting democratic and human rights norms were low, i.e. did not threaten regime survival. Acquis conditionality regarding the specific rules of the EU began to have major effects only during the accession negotiations.

Diez et al. (2006) find that the “transformative power of integration” in border conflicts is strongest when all parties to the conflict are EU members, much weaker when they are only associated to the EU, and even negative when the outer border of the EU coincides with the contested border. According to Diez et al., this is not only because of conditionality. Membership, and association to a lesser extent, also increase the legitimacy of EU positions (enabling impact), support for common activities (connective impact), and exposure to the constructive impact (Diez et al. 2006: 573-574, 588).

Finally, Bauer et al. (2007), too, generally expect the potential impact of the EU to be higher in states with good prospects for membership than in “unlikely members”. Again, this not only applies to the governance mode of compliance (conditionality). Whereas, however, the compliance mode is expected to have no effect in non-candidate countries, both competition and communication are hypothesized to have at least a limited effect in the long term to the extent that non-candidate countries are subject to market pressures generated in the EU and take part in EU-sponsored policy networks.

"Europeanization beyond Europe" Frank Schimmelfennig http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2007-1

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