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2.5 Constructivist institutionalism

Processes of socialisation and persuasion are a mechanism for the EU’s domestic impact, which rationalist approaches discard, but constructivism or sociological institutionalism are well equipped to analyse. Through such processes, candidate countries come to consider that the EU’s rules have an intrinsic value, regardless of the material incentives for adopting them.

2.5.1 EU strategy: socialisation and persuasion

A number of factors increase the likelihood that persuasion and socialisation are effective. If a candidate country – both elites and publics – positively identifies with the EU, or holds it in high regard, the government is more likely to be open to persuasion and to consider the rules that the EU promotes as positive (Epstein 2006aJump To The Next Citation PointKubicek 2003cJump To The Next Citation Point: 14-15; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005cJump To The Next Citation Point: 19).

Likewise, if a candidate country considers that the process through which EU conditions are made, and the process through which the EU transfers its rules to candidates, as legitimate, it is more likely to adopt these rules. Facilitating factors thus include the participation of the target countries in setting conditions and the making of rules – both of which were problematic in the case of candidates as opposed to full members. Furthermore, to be perceived legitimate, the conditions for candidates must not be more onerous than for the incumbents (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005cJump To The Next Citation Point: 18-19; Schwellnus 2006). Moreover, legitimacy increases with the use of soft tactics rather than overt pressure (Kubicek 2003cJump To The Next Citation Point: 16), and a ‘low density of EU demands’, which allows domestic actors ‘to engage in relatively unpressured “learning” (Jacoby 2004Jump To The Next Citation Point: 10).’

2.5.2 Domestic politics: normative resonance

Constructivist institutionalism emphasises that the EU’s impact that does not (only) depend on the domestic material interest constellations, but on the extent to which there is a ‘cultural match’ or ‘resonance’ between EU demands and domestic rules and political discourses (Epstein 2006aGrigorescu 2002Kubicek 2003cJump To The Next Citation Point: 13-14; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005cJump To The Next Citation Point: 20; Schwellnus 2005Jump To The Next Citation Point).

Transnational networks that connect elites in candidate countries and with the EU are a facilitating factor for the EU’s influence for both rationalist and constructivist institutionalist approaches. The latter emphasise particularly the role of transnational epistemic communities that do not only exercise pressures on governments, but contribute to persuading them of the legitimacy of the rules in question (Johnson 2006Jump To The Next Citation PointKubicek 2003c: 15-16; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005cJump To The Next Citation Point: 23). The EU’s twinning programme, in which officials seconded from the member states assisted their counterparts in the candidate countries with adopting EU legislation in their area of expertise, could facilitate such processes. (Tulmets 2005). However, obstacles to influence and ‘cognitive convergence’ include factors such as the institutional fluidity of programmes or the politicisation of projects, and their success depends much on the individuals involved (Grabbe 2003Jump To The Next Citation Point: 315; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2004Pridham 2005Jump To The Next Citation Point: 125-126; Steffens 2003).


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