2.4 Rationalist institutionalism

Rationalist institutionalism focuses on the use of conditionality by the EU to influence candidate countries. Most studies that analyse the effectiveness of conditionality identify factors relating to its application by the EU to explain variations in its impact. At the domestic level, rationalist institutionalism focuses – just as in studies of member state Europeanisation – on the differential empowerment of domestic actors.

2.4.1 EU strategy: conditional incentives

A number of studies consider the clarity of the EU’s demands as an important factor increasing the likelihood of effectiveness. Clarity means that the candidates need to know what they need to do if they decide to comply with the EU’s conditions. It applies to both whether a certain issue area is included and what particular rules the candidates need to adopt (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c

). Uncertainty might stem from evolving rules in the EU, such as the Schengen acquis (Grabbe 2003

, 2005

), from the absence of a single EU model in many policy areas, as well as from learning processes (and internal conflict) within the Commission about what model might be most suitable for candidates (Hughes et al. 2004b

). For example, initially some parts of the Commission informally advocated a model of regional policy based on democratic regional self-government, before the Commission expressed a preference for more centralised management of the structural funds.

Another key factor is the credibility of EU conditionality. Credibility has two sides. The candidates have to be certain that they will receive the promised rewards after meeting the EU’s demands. Yet they also have to believe that they will only receive the reward if they indeed fully meet the requirements. Thus, credibility relates to the consistent, merit-based application of conditionality by the EU (Kubicek 2003c : 18; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c : 13-16; Vachudová 2005 : 112-120). It suffers both if political conflicts inside the EU make candidates doubt that the EU will deliver (as in the debates surrounding the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey) and if suspicions arise over whether political favouritism, ulterior motives, or side-payments led to rewards for candidates who did not meet (all) the requirements (fully) (as in the run-up to the start of negotiations with Bulgaria, Romania, or Croatia).

Superior bargaining power, resulting from asymmetrical interdependence in favour of the EU, is a precondition for the ability of the EU to withhold rewards if its conditions have not been met (Moravcsik and Vachudová 2003 ; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c : 14). However, the EU’s bargaining power affects also another factor: the size of the rewards and benefits that the EU can use as leverage ( Grabbe 2003 ; Kubicek 2003c : 17-18; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c : 13; Vachudová 2005 : 63-79,108-110). The ultimate reward of EU membership is indeed a sizeable benefit for candidates, but sometimes the payment of the reward is distant. The use of intermediate rewards is therefore important. The EU can tie both offers of trade and aid, as well as its role as a gatekeeper to different stages of the accession progress to the fulfilment of specific conditions (e.g. Grabbe 2003 : 316).

The credibility of conditionality is also linked to the ability of the EU to monitor effectively the fulfilment of its requirements (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c : 15). Information asymmetries usually work in favour of candidate countries. In the case of eastern enlargement, the EU has therefore made significant investment into its monitoring capacity, which contrasts starkly with the decentralised mechanism of monitoring compliance with EU rules in the member states.

2.4.2 Domestic politics: differential empowerment and costs

Rationalist institutionalism also specifies a number of mediating factors at the domestic level that mediate the EU’s influence. Studies usually identify different sets of factors, depending on whether the EU’s influence is aimed at the polity dimension (democratic principles, human rights and minority protection) or the policy dimension.

In the polity dimension, Vachudová (2005 ) and Schimmelfennig (2005 ) identify as a key facilitating factor the presence of a liberal democratic government, for which the costs of meeting the EU’s demands are unlikely to be prohibitively high. More specifically, Vachudová (2005 ) emphasises the quality of political competition at the moment of regime change, which in turn depends on a strong opposition to communism and a reforming communist party. Kelley (2004 ) operationalises the absence of costly domestic opposition as the dominance of liberal ethnic policy preferences over nationalists in parliament.

In the policy dimension, a low ‘actor density’ in a policy area (Jacoby 2004 : 9), or a low number of veto players (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c ) is a key facilitating factor. In turn, the number of actors opposed to the EU’s demands is likely to be low, if a policy area does not have strong institutional legacies (see also e.g. Hughes et al. 2004b ), or if a sector of the economy is highly internationalised (Andonova 2003 ).