4 Conclusion: gaps and new directions

The recent emergence of book-length theoretical studies of the Europeanisation of applicant states have contributed greatly to the emergence of this field as a distinctive, fairly coherent and increasingly sophisticated research area (Andonova 2003 ; Dimitrova 2004 ; Grabbe 2006 ; Hughes et al. 2004b ; Jacoby 2004 ; Kelley 2004 ; Linden 2002 ; Pridham 2005 ; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006 ; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b ; Vachudová 2005 ). These developments suggest that it is indeed possible and fruitful for the research community to think of candidate country Europeanisation as a distinctive sub-field of research. Factors that make the more recent cases of candidate Europeanisation distinctive are not only the particular socio-economic characteristics of the post-communist countries, but also the sustained attempts by the EU to transfer its rules to non-members prior to accession, underpinned by accession conditionality; the top-down, rather than two-way nature of Europeanisation; and the significant power asymmetry between the EU and the targets of Europeanisation (see also Börzel and Sedelmeier 2006 ; Goetz 2005 ; Grabbe 2003 ; Héritier 2005 ; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c ).

At the same time, this distinctiveness does certainly not mean that candidate Europeanisation should be studied in isolation from broader debates. The insights to be gained from research in this area have been greatest precisely when it has been well connected to Europeanisation studies more generally, and to key theoretical debates in the broader disciplines of International Relations and Comparative Politics.

Analyses of the Europeanisation of candidate countries suggest that rationalist institutionalism is well suited to explaining the EU’s domestic impact and that conditionality is the dominant mechanism of the EU’s influence. At the same time, these studies also suggest that it is important to distinguish clearly between ‘conditionality’ as a strategy used by the EU, and ‘conditionality’ as an explanatory model or ideal-typical mechanism of EU influence. To avoid confusion, the latter might be more usefully substituted for a ‘rationalist institutionalist’ approach or ‘external incentives’ model. This holds that conditionality as a strategy is only effective under clearly defined conditions, most importantly, a credible membership perspective as the main reward offered by the EU, and that domestic adjustment costs are not prohibitively high for incumbent governments and do not threaten their power base.

On the one hand, most studies find that the EU’s conditionality – as a strategy – has been fairly successful, and generally more successful than normative pressure and socialisation (alone). Yet, many studies also find that there have been limits to the EU’s influence through conditionality and that its impact has been differential (Hughes et al. 2004b ; Jacoby 2004 ; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005c : 2-3).

On the other hand, with regard to theoretical findings, most studies also agree, at least implicitly, that not only the success, but also the limitations of the EU’s conditionality – i.e. the conditions that determine its effectiveness – are best explained by a rationalist institutionalist approach. Rationalist institutionalism emphasises conditionality – rather than alternative mechanisms such as socialisation – but crucially also specifies both international and domestic mediating factors. Thus, it explicitly takes into account that ‘conditionality’ is far from an homogeneous instrument that is applied uniformly across countries and issue areas.

4.1 Gaps in the literature
  4.1.1 Comparisons across enlargement rounds
  4.1.2 Domestic politics
4.2 New directions
  4.2.1 Compliance after accession
  4.2.2 Conditionality beyond EU candidacy