4 Aggregation of voter preferences

So far we have analysed the role of parties in aggregating the preferences of elected representatives in the EP. What, though, of their role in aggregating the preferences of voters in European elections? From the outset European elections have been understood as ‘second-order’ contests that are decided on national issues and influenced by national electoral cycles (Reif and Schmitt 1980 ). This implies parties do not do much to structure and then aggregate voter choice around issues relevant to the European Union itself.

Recent research, however, suggests a number of refinements to second-order theory.

On the one hand, second-orderness is increasingly understood as a complex of different behaviours. Thus European elections are used by some voters to sanction governing parties. Others use them to vote ‘more sincerely’ and ‘less strategically’ by plumping for small national parties they are normally deterred from supporting for fear of wasting their vote (Hix and Marsh 2005 ). Both behaviours are ways of using European elections for domestic purposes. Yet they are quite different in their consequences for representation at Union level. By boosting the representation of national opposition parties, the former increases the probability that the European Parliament will check and balance the Council of Ministers. By increasing the number of national parties that are likely to be represented in the EP, the latter somewhat fragments representation in the Parliament to the benefit of its peripheral groups (Bardi 1996 ).

On the other hand, second-orderness may itself be a matter of degree, and limited ‘break-outs’ from it would seem to be possible. The following are examples:

Voters may get opportunities to vote for at least some parties that mainly fight European elections on the issue of European integration. Although they are much more common at the Eurosceptic end of the pro-anti integration continuum and any MEPs elected in their name are probably less ‘coalitionable’ than any other category of representative in EP votes, parties specifically organised for registering preferences on integration itself have appeared in Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and Sweden (Thorlakson 2005 : 480).
Parties may give different salience to different aspects of their appeal when they fight European as opposed to national elections, or voters may find different reasons for voting for them in the two contests. There is evidence that parties which campaign with a clear position either for or against European integration (Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004 ) do better in European elections than would be predicted from a straightforward application of the second-order model (Hix and Marsh 2005 : 22). By appealing to differences in competences and policy opportunity structures at the Union and national levels, parties can likewise persuade voters to switch for the purposes of European elections only. Thus Green parties have pitched to those who favour strict environmental policies at Union level which they would oppose at national level for fear of lost competitiveness (Carrubba and Timpone 2005 ).
Sometimes candidates from the same national party can compete more or less explicitly against one another in European elections. This can allow otherwise ideologically similar voters and candidates to differ on EU issues. Examples include: Ireland where European elections are contested in multi-member constituencies; Finland where open-lists allow voters to change the order in which candidates are ranked; and France where ‘notables’ from the same political family have fielded lists in competition with one another.